Abstract. We analyze axiomatic properties of three types of additive solutions of cooperative games with a priori unions structure. One of these is the Banzhaf value with a priori unions introduced by G. Owen (1981) , which has not been axiomatically characterized as yet. Generalizing Owen's approach and the constructions discussed by J. Deegan and E. W. Packel (1979) and L. M. Ruiz, F. Valenciano and J. M. Zarzuelo (1996) we define and study two other solutions. These are the Deegan-Packel value with a priori unions and the least square prenucleolus with a priori unions.
The set of all preimputations of v will be denoted by P, and the (2 n − 1)-dimensional vector space of all n-person games will be denoted by G N .
A solution is defined to be a function ϕ : G N → R n , which assigns to each game v a vector from R n . The common feature of all solutions considered below is additivity: Definition 2 (E. Lehrer (1988) ). Amalgamation of any two different players a, b of an n-person game v is a transformation from game v into game v (ab) with the set of players (N \ {a, b}) ∪ {p}, where p denotes a player representing the coalition {a, b}. The characteristic function of this game is defined to be
Here is the first axiomatization of the Banzhaf value, given in 1988.
Theorem 1 (E. Lehrer (1988) (iv) Additivity.
Definition 3. The Deegan-Packel value of any player i ∈ N of game v is defined by the formula
where k = card(K) for any K ⊆ N .
Let σ be a permutation of the set N . Then we define σv(σK) = v(K) for any K ⊆ N , where σ(K) = {σ(i) : i ∈ K}. A player i ∈ N is called a zero-player if for any K ⊆ N , v(K) = 0 whenever i ∈ K. Below we give an axiomatization of solution described in Definition 3.
Theorem 2 (J. Deegan and E. W. Packel (1979) ). The solution ϕ(v) = DP(v) = (DP 1 (v), . . . , DP n (v)) is the unique solution on G N which satisfies the following conditions:
(ii) For any permutation σ of the set N and every i ∈ N we have
Definition 4 (L. M. Ruiz, F. Valenciano and J. M. Zarzuelo (1996) ). The least square prenucleolus of game v is a preimputation x of this game such that
where r (v, x) denotes the arithmetic mean of the coordinates of r (v, x) . The ith coordinate of this solution is said to be the least square prenucleolity value and is denoted by
L. M. Ruiz et al. (1996) proved that for any n-person game v and any player i ∈ N the least square prenucleolus can be expressed by the formula
as well as
This last equality shows that the least square prenucleolity value is an additive normalization of the Banzhaf value.
In L. M. Ruiz, F. Valenciano and J. M. Zarzuelo (1996) the following axiomatic theorem was proved:
is the unique solution on G N which satisfies the following axioms: 
Now we will present a generalization of the construction of solution with a priori unions proposed by G. Owen (1977 and 1981) and applied to define the Shapley and the Banzhaf values with a priori unions, respectively. But first we define the a priori unions structure.
Definition 5. Let m be a natural number not greater than n. A system of m subsets of N , T = (T 1 , . . . , T m ), is called an a priori unions structure if it is a division of the set N , i.e. Construction 1. Let ϕ be a solution on G N for any natural number n. Suppose that for the n-person cooperative game v an a priori unions structure T is defined. A solution ϕ(v, T ) with a priori unions can be constructed in two steps:
Step 1. Let j ∈ M , let K be a subset of T j , and set K = T j \K. Consider the game v T,K whose players are the a priori unions of T and
Let v j be a game with the set of players
Step 2. We construct a solution ϕ(v j ) of the game
for every i ∈ T j and j ∈ M , is called the solution ϕ with a priori unions.
Note that if ϕ(v) is a preimputation of any n-person game v, then ϕ(v, T ) is also a preimputation of this game. Indeed, in this case, ϕ(v j ) is a preimputation of v j for any j ∈ M and hence i∈T j
Definition 7 (G. Owen (1981) ). The ith coordinate of the solution with a priori unions (see Construction 1) for
is said to be the Banzhaf value with a priori unions of player i ∈ T j of game v. It is denoted by B i (v, T ) and can be expressed by the formula
where
Definition 8. The ith coordinate of the solution with a priori unions for ϕ(v) = DP(v) = (DP 1 (v), . . . , DP n (v)) is said to be the Deegan-Packel value with a priori unions of player i ∈ T j of game v and is denoted by DP i (v, T ).
Definition 9. The ith coordinate of the solution with a priori unions
for the least square prenucleolus, is said to be the least square prenucleolity value with a priori unions of player i ∈ T j of game v and is denoted by 
II. An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value with a priori unions.
By application of the axioms in Theorem 1 (after some modification) and introduction of a new important balance property one can formulate a consistent system of axioms which characterizes the Banzhaf value with a priori unions.
In the case of the solution with a priori unions the additivity axiom is formulated as follows:
Additivity with a priori unions:
for any n-person games v, w with the same a priori unions structure T .
Set
Theorem 4. The solution ϕ with a priori unions on G N with given
if and only if the following conditions hold for any
Additivity with a priori unions.
Axiom (i) (dummy player axiom) is identical as in the case of the "normal" Banzhaf value (see Theorem 2); equal treatment and amalgamation properties ((ii) and (iv)) are here restricted to the members of the same a priori union. A new condition is (iii), called the balance property. This axiom reflects the fact that breaking up cooperation between two individuals should affect both individuals equally.
The balance axiom was formulated by M. Vázquez-Brage, A. van den Nouweland and I. García-Jurado (1997) , who used it to axiomatize the Shapley value in "airport" games (a special case of cooperative games).
Proof of Theorem 4. Let v be any n-person cooperative game with the a priori unions structure T . The solution B(v, T
The proof of the dummy player, equilibrium, balance and additivity properties follows directly from formula (2).
Suppose that j ∈ M and two different players a, b ∈ T j have been amalgamated. Then from Theorem 1 and the construction of the Banzhaf value with a priori unions we obtain
, because the characteristic functions of both games are identical. Thus
In this way we proved that the amalgamation axiom is satisfied by the Banzhaf value with a priori unions. Now we must prove the sufficiency of properties (i)-(v). Let T 0 and T # be the trivial a priori unions structures, i.e. T 0 consists only of one-player a priori unions and in T # the only a priori union is the set of all players.
for any solution γ of an n-person game v with a priori unions structure T .
Suppose that two different solutions ϕ
(v, T ) and ϕ
(v, T ) of game v with structure T satisfy axioms (i)- (v) . Backward induction on the number of a priori unions (i.e. on m) and the forward induction on the number of members of the given a priori union T j ∈ T (i.e. on t j ) will be used. From properties (i), (ii), (iv), (v) and Theorem 1 it follows that ϕ
Suppose that for any a priori unions structure T with m + 1 unions we have the equality ϕ
(v, T ). We will prove that if the number of a priori unions is m then the solutions ϕ
Let T j be an a priori union chosen from T for some j ∈ M . Two cases are possible:
Let a, b be any two different players of T j . Then by property (iii) for k = 1, 2 we have T (a) ). By the induction hypothesis,
This means that there exists a constant λ such that for any a ∈ T j ,
a (v, T ) = λ. Now we argue by induction on t j . When t j = 2, then as a result of amalgamation of players a, b we obtain
and by (ii),
Suppose that card(T j ) = t j ≥ 3 and a, b, c are three different players which belong to T j . Thus, by (iii) (and for any k = 1, 2),
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis,
Hence there exists a constant µ such that for every player c in T j \{a, b}∪{p} we have ϕ
The induction hypothesis implies that µ = 0. Hence and from (iv) we have (v, T ) . In this way the proof of Theorem 4 is complete.
III. Properties of the Deegan-Packel value with a priori unions.
We adopt the convention that the cardinality of a set is denoted by the corresponding lower case letter, e.g. card(K) = k etc.
According to Construction 1, the Deegan-Packel value with a priori unions of any player i which belongs to the a priori union T j , j ∈ M , can be expressed by the formula
In our axiomatization of this solution (similarly to the case of the Shapley value with a priori unions, cf. G. Owen (1977) ) symmetry axioms of two types are formulated: symmetry under permutation of the players of N and under permutation of the a priori unions structure. 
. , DP n (v, T )) if and only if the following conditions hold for any v ∈ G N : (i) If i ∈ N is a zero-player then ϕ i (v, T ) = 0 (zero-player axiom). (ii) For every constant c ∈ R and for any
( (σv, σT ) , where σT = (σT 1 , . . . , σT m ) (symmetry with respect to players).
iii) For every permutation σ of N and for any
(
iv) For every permutation of M and for any
i ∈ N , ϕ i (v, T ) = ϕ i (v, T ), where T = (T (1) , . .
. , T (m) ) (symmetry with respect to a priori unions). (v) If ω is a game with the set of players N such that ω(Q
S \ T j ∪ K) = sk · v(Q S \ T j ∪ K) for all ∅ = S ⊆ M , ∅ = K ⊆ T j , and j ∈ M then ϕ i (ω, T ) = S⊆M j∈S K⊆T j i∈K v(Q S \ T j ∪ K) for every i ∈ T j .
(vi) Additivity with a priori unions.
This system of axioms is similar to the set of axioms for the Shapley value with a priori unions (cf. G. Owen (1977) ). The main difference is axiom (iv). Because in Construction 1 the coalitions of non-trivial subsets of different a priori unions (i.e. P 1 ∪ . . . ∪ P m , where P j T j , j = 1, . . . , m, and at least two sets of P 1 , . . . , P m are non-empty) are ignored, the Deegan-Packel value with a priori unions for all players must also depend only on the worth of the sets
Axiom (v) also shows that in the game in which the worth of a coalition depends only on its cardinality, the analyzed solution depends only on the real value of each player and the a priori union which includes him.
Proof of Theorem 5. The solution DP(v, T ) satisfies all the above-mentioned axioms. Conversely, suppose that ϕ(v, T ) is a solution of an n-person
game v with a priori unions structure T which satisfies axioms (i)-(v). Note (cf. G. Owen (1977) ) that any game v can be uniquely represented as a linear combination of the n-person games w R (R ⊆ N ) with the same a priori unions structure T and the characteristic function defined as
We can restrict ourselves to those games w
and ϕ i (w R , T ) = 0 for any i ∈ N \ T j . Consider a game ω with the set of players N and with the a priori unions structure T , whose characteristic function is defined as follows:
otherwise.
On the other hand, we have ω(U ) = sk · w R (U ) for any U ⊆ N and by (ii),
sk and for any constant c and game cw R , where
we have
In the other cases ϕ i (cw R , T ) = 0 for any i ∈ N .
By the additivity axiom (vi) we obtain finally
for any i ∈ T j and j ∈ M .
On the basis of the above-mentioned results we can formulate two remarks. First, the solution DP(v, T ) satisfies the balance axiom. Namely, for any a, b ∈ T j and j ∈ M we have
In the case of the "normal" Deegan-Packel value axiom (iv) is equivalent to the following property: if ϑ is a game with the set of players N such that
This property seems weaker than axiom (iii) of Theorem 2, because it concerns only some specifically defined type of games.
IV. An axiomatic characterization of the least square prenucleolus with a priori unions. Now we will present the most important properties of the least square prenucleolus with a priori unions, which are necessary to formulate the axiomatic theorem regarding this solution.
Lemma 1. For any a priori union T j which belongs to the structure T and any i ∈ T j the least prenucleolity value of player i can be expressed as:
Proof. The above formula can be obtained from formula (1) applied to game v j :
Next we replace the values v j (K) for any K ⊆ T j with the formula calculated also on the basis of (1):
This is the least square prenucleolity value of player j of game v T,K .
Lemma 2. For any player i ∈ N of an additive game v with a priori unions structure T , L i (v, T ) = v({i}).
Proof. If v is an additive game, then so is v T,K (for any K ⊆ T j and any j ∈ M ). Hence from Theorem 3,
, and v j is also an additive game. Finally, it follows that 
Proof. The least square prenucleolus with a priori unions satisfies axioms (i) -(v) . This is a consequence of the relevant properties of the "normal" least square prenucleolus as well as of Construction 1 and Lemmas 1 and 2.
Suppose
that a solution ϕ(v, T ) satisfies (i)-(v). Define
Because by ( 
As mentioned in the proof of Theorem 5, every n-person game v with a priori unions structure T can be uniquely represented as a linear combination of the games w R . In our case the considerations can be restricted to those games w
. . , m} (in the other cases, from (i), (iii) and (iv) we obtain ϕ i (w R , T ) = 0 for any i ∈ N ). Note that for any R ⊆ N and any i ∈ N \ T j we have ϕ i (w R , T ) = 0. Thus from (i) and (iv) it follows that there exists a non-negative constant ξ S such that if R = N then
and ψ j ((w N ) * ) = 1/m for any j ∈ M . Note that ξ S = 0 if S = ∅. Therefore from the additivity axiom we conclude that for any two disjoint subsets S 1 and S 2 of M we have the equality
By symmetry we have ψ j 1 ((w
This relation holds for any two nonempty coalitions different from M . If S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅ and S 1 ∪ S 2 = M then (5) applies to S 1 and M \ (S 1 ∪ S 2 ) as well as to S 2 and M \ (S 1 ∪ S 2 ), and hence to S 1 , S 2 . In the case of S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅ and S 1 ∪ S 2 = M , the relation (5) applies to disjoint sets S 1 and M \ S 1 as well as to S 2 and M \ S 2 , and therefore to M \ S 1 and M \ S 2 , as well as to
Consider the additive game v * . Then from (v) we conclude that ξ = 1/(m2 m−2 ) and
From (ii) and (iii) it follows that there exist positive constants
In particular, if K = ∅, T j and S = M then
Note moreover that if S = M and K = T j then ϕ i (w R , T ) = 1/(mt j ). Of course, we have ϕ i (w R , T ) = 0 if R = ∅. Consider two sets:
Thus, by additivity with a priori unions,
and hence
From (ii) and (iii) it follows that (8)
From (6) and (7) we conclude that β S = 1 m2 m−2 s(m − s) for any S ⊆ M. In this way (9) β S 1 /(s 1 (m − s 1 )) = β S 2 /(s 2 (m − s 2 )) for any S 1 , S 2 ⊆ M.
Note that from (8) and (9) we have
The proof of sufficiency of the conditions of the theorem is complete, because from (1a) it follows that for these coefficients α, β, (11) is equivalent to (4).
Conditions (iii) and (iv) can be easily replaced with the following two axioms connected with axiom (iv) of Theorem 3 (i.e. with average marginal contribution monotonicity): G. Owen (1977) proved that Sh(v, T ) = (Sh 1 (v, T ), . . . , Sh n (v, T )) where Sh i (v, T ) is the Shapley value with a priori unions constructed by Construction 1 for ϕ(v) = Sh(v) = (Sh 1 (v), . . . , Sh n (v)) and
is the unique solution which satisfies axioms (i)-(iv) in Theorem 6 and the dummy player axiom ((i) in Theorem 1). Hence we can conclude that the main difference between the Shapley value with a priori unions and the least square prenucleolus with a priori unions is that the former solution satisfies a more general dummy player axiom. Therefore, the least square prenucleolus with a priori unions is determined by a system of weaker conditions.
